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NATURAL RESOURCES AND PUBLIC LANDS
OVERVIEW
Economic exposure and contractual uncertainty have intensified for
the oil and gas and mining industries. These negative factors are a di-
rect result of the Tenth Circuit Court's decisions analyzed during this
survey period.
In Park County Resource Council v. Department of Agriculture,' the court
concluded that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not
automically require the preparation of an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) for issuance of federal onshore oil and gas leases. The court
ruled, however, that NEPA challenges may be initiated against holders
of federal onshore oil and gas leases at any time, so long as exploration or
development operations are in progress or contemplated for the leased
land. NEPA contains no statute of limitations and the court was unwill-
ing to limit its application with other federal statutes. Thus, the Park
County court has vested NEPA proponents with new latitude to pursue
NEPA challenges free from time restraints. Susceptibility to this contin-
uous right to assert NEPA challenges serves to undermine the value of
issued and approved federal oil and gas leases by diminishing the oil and
gas industry's incentive to undertake costly and often risk laden explora-
tory ventures on federal lands.
While the oil and gas industry began to battle with this new dimen-
sion of economic uncertainty, the coal industry learned from the com-
panion cases of Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel 2 and FMC Wyoming Corp.
v. Hodel3 that the coal industry's vested, indeterminate-term commercial
coal lease contracts are no longer vested contractual rights. Rather,
these contracts are actually agreements of a finite term, subject to mate-
rial alteration by the Federal Coal Lease Amendment Act when such
leases celebrate their next anniversary. These changes create substan-
tial economic problems for coal mining companies who have tailored
their supply and price committments to the 'original terms of the coal
lease contract.
In Martin Exploration Management Co. v. FERC,4 the Tenth Circuit
held that when Congress provides oil and gas producers with the right
to elect the highest price for natural gas under the complex regulatory
scheme found in the Natural Gas Policy Act, such right shall not be sum-
marily abrogated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in the
name of reasonable rulemaking.
The Tenth Circuit held in Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico,5 that
I. 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987).
2. 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987).
3. 816 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987).
4. 813 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1987).
5. 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987).
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the Indian Claims Commission Act was established to provide the sole
forum and remedy for Indian claims arising before 1946. The harsh
outcome of this case renders all courts incompetent to entertain any
claim arising before 1946 and those not timely submitted to the Indian
Claims Commission. By sleeping on its rights, the Navajo Tribe missed
the opportunity to avail itself to the only forum empowered to hear its
case.
I. NEPA CHALLENGE TO FEDERAL ONSHORE OIL AND GAS LEASING
A. Park County Resource Council v. Department of Agriculture
1. Background
This case further defined the relationship between the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 6 and onshore federal oil and gas
leases by expanding plaintiff's rights under NEPA. The primary issue in
Park County 7 was whether an EIS was required prior to the issuance of a
federal onshore oil and gas lease. The lease at issue covered non-wil-
derness federal lands and was subject to customized stipulations limiting
the scope of exploration activities. These stipulations restricting the
lessee's activities, were designed to minimize environmental damage. 8
Before reaching the primary issue, however, the Park County court faced
three distinct procedural issues of equal importance: (1) whether Park
County Resource Council's (Park) claim was time-barred by the ninety
day statute of limitations as found in the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of
1920 (MLLA), 9 (2) whether Park's claim was time-barred by the equita-
ble doctrine of laches, 10 and (3) whether the courts were unavailable to
Park due to its failure to exhaust administrative remedies.' ' The district
6. The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1982) provides:
all agencies of the Federal Government shall- . . . (C) include in every recommen-
dation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by
the responsible official on - (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the propo-
sal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship
between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented. Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsi-
ble Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any envi-
ronmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and
views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized
to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the
President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by
section 552 of title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing
agency review processes.
7. Park Count,, 817 F.2d at 620.
8. Id. at 612-13.
9. 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1982).
10. Park County, 817 F.2d at 617. The district court concluded that the equitable doc-
trine of laches applied since Park County's delay in filing a known claim prejudiced the
intervenor, Marathon Oil Company. Park County v. Department of Agriculture, 613 F.
Supp. 1182 (D. Wyo. 1985).
11. Park Comity, 817 F.2d at 619. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.411 (1987).
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court found that all three procedural points barred Park from pursuing
its substantive claim in court. This ruling forced Park to appeal the
lower court's decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
2. Facts
Park's case was comprised of three substantive claims. First, Park
asserted that the BLM should have prepared an EIS covering the entire
lease area prior to issuing the oil and gas lease. 12 It claimed that lease
issuance constitutes a major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, thereby requiring an EIS under
NEPA. 13 Second, it claimed that the site specific North Fork well EIS
was inadequate because it failed to address the cumulative surface im-
pact that may result from a successful well completion. 14 Third, Park
contended that the defendants violated the Endangered Species Act, 15
alleging that they failed to draft appropriate measures protecting nearby
grizzly bears. 16
In June 1983, Marathon Oil Company (successor in interest to May
Petroleum, Inc., and representing co-owners Amarada Hess Corp. and
Rosewood Resources, Inc.) submitted to the BLM an Application for
Permit to Drill (APD) covering the North Fork well location. 17 The APD
was approved after the BLM prepared an EIS for the well site.
Thereafter, Park filed a complaint seeking an injunction prohibiting
oil and gas exploration and drilling on the lease, alleging that the BLM
prepared an inadequate EIS and thus failed to comply with NEPA. 18
Park also sought a declaratory judgement that an EIS should have been
prepared prior to the issuance of the federal oil and gas lease. Park alleged
that the act of issuing the lease constituted a major federal action which
significantly affected the quality of the human environment because the
lease vested the lessee with the right to drill wells on National Forest
Service land. 19
a. North Fork Lease and Well Location
Park's request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting drilling at
the North Fork site obligated Park to prove that irreparable harm would
12. Id. at 615, 620.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 614.
15. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982).
16. Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1185, 1188.
17. Id. at 1184.
18. Id. at 1184-85.
19. Id. at 1185. Park County, 817 F.2d at 614. Moreover, Park County prayed for an
order "requiring defendants to withdraw their approval on any leases or permits previ-
ously given pending their compliance with ... NEPA." Id. Park's motion for a temporary
restraining order was denied June, 1985. The parties agreed to consolidate the hearing of
Park's motion for preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits. The district court de-
nied Park's motion for preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Park unsuccessfully sought a stay pending appeal from the Tenth Circuit. Thereafter, Park
petitioned the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court for a stay in July 1985.
This petition was denied in October 1985. 106 S. Ct. 42 (1985).
1988]
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occur to the surrounding environment. 20 The North Fork well was
staked on an untimbered ridge located 28 miles west of Cody, Wyoming,
and 26 miles east of Yellowstone National Park, in the Shoshone Na-
tional Forest. 2 1 The district court concluded the area was "not pristine,
or primitive, or even very unusual."' 22 The North Fork well was com-
pleted as a dry hole during the course of this action and reclamation
work has been completed and continues to be monitored. 23 Moreover,
Congress had had three opportunities to designate the area as a "Wil-
derness Area," but declined to do so.
24
Prior to offering the lease, the Forest Service issued a "Finding of
No Significant Impact" (FONSI). 2 5 This means, that with appropriate
controls protecting environmental resources, an EIS at the leasing stage
would not be necessary. 2 6 Indeed, when the lease was issued, it was
subject to a number of provisions and stipulations protecting the envi-
ronment from the harmful affects of oil and gas exploration.
2 7
The district court ruled that the EIS prepared on the North Fork
well site was adequate. It also declared that the BLM was not obligated
to prepare an additional EIS prior to lease issuance. 2 8 Its ruling on this
issue, however, was one of accommodation only, since it had ruled that
Park County lost the right to attack the issuance of the lease.2 9 The
district court found that Park's EIS attack was time-barred by the ninety
day statute of limitations in the MLLA; furthermore, Park's claim was
barred by the equitable doctrine of laches; and finally it was prohibited
from pursuing its claim because it failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies30
3. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's decision,
the Tenth Circuit declared that the BLM's decision to issue the lease
without first preparing an EIS was reasonable, 3 ' in that the lease issu-
ance itself was not a major federal action significantly affecting the qual-
ity of the human environment. The court grounded its conclusion on
the bases that (1) substantial mitigating measures were imposed on Mar-
athon's activities; (2) further environmental appraisals prior to any sur-
face disturbance were required; (3) the possibility of future drilling
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 103.
21. Id. at 1184.
22. Id. at 1187. The court noted that the North Fork well area has always been a
multiple-use area, as recently reaffirmed by Congress when it enacted the Wyoming Wil-
derness Act of 1984. See Wyoming Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-550, 98 Stat.
2807 (1984).
23. Park County, 817 F.2d at 614.
24. Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1187.
25. Park County, 817 F.2d at 612.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 613.
28. Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1186-87.
29. Id. at 1186.
30. Id.
31. Park County, 817 F.2d at 624.
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activities at time of lease issuance were remote; and (4) federal agencies
would have significant involvement in any future exploration activities.
32
Judge McKay, writing for the court, removed the procedural hur-
dles erected by the lower court's decision. He declared that Park's ac-
tion was not time-barred under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920,
that the equitable doctrine of laches did not bar Park from pursuing its
action, and that the failure to exhaust the administrative remedies doc-
trine was inapplicable to Park in this case. 33 The Tenth Circuit refused
to address, however, the adequacy of the EIS covering the APD. It had
declared this issue moot since the well was completed as a dry hole.
5 4
a. NEPA Not Subject to MLLA's Statute of Limitations
In an issue of first impression, the district court held that a NEPA
challenge to an oil and gas lease on federal forest land issued without an
EIS is not subject to the ninety day statute of limitations found in the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.35 The statute, in the pertinent part,
provides that "[n]o action contesting a decision of the Secretary involv-
ing an oil and gas lease shall be maintained unless such action is com-
menced or taken within ninety days after the final decision of the
Secretary relating to such matter."' 36 Park knew as early as 1983 that the
lease was issued without an EIS, but chose not to bring this action until
1985.3 7 The Tenth Circuit, in concluding the trial court had erred,
adopted the reasoning established by the Ninth Circuit Court in Jones v.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 619.
34. Id. at 614-15. The court discussed the case-or-controversy requirement for fed-
eral court jurisdiction: the litigant must have suffered actual injury "that can be redressed
by favorable judicial decision." Park County, 817 F.2d at 614. The court concluded that
the "redressability arm of the case-or-controversy requirement is not satisfied here." Id at.
615. There was no meaningful remedy which Park County could obtain because the com-
pletion of all activities authorized by the permit to drill had been completed. Thus, it
concluded, reversal of the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction prohibiting
drilling would result in an "empty gesture." Id. at 615. The court conceded that although
redressability was possible when the suit was initiated (well activity in progress), the court
forfeited its jurisdiction at the time the well was plugged, abandoned and reclaimed. "[A]
court can determine the merits of a controversy only if jurisdiction exists at all stages of
the proceeding." Id. at 615 (quoting Amalgamated Sugar v. Bergland, 664 F.2d 818, 822
(10th Cir. 1981)).
Plaintiffs addressed the mootness issue by arguing that in spite of the fact that the
North Fork well was plugged and abandoned, the issue surrounding the adequacy of the
EIS was of such "great public importance" it required consideration by the court. The
court rebutted that the "[elmotional involvement in a law suit is not enough to meet the
case-or-controversy requirement." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Mathis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977)
(per curiam).
35. 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1982). The court overruled the district court's finding which
declared that the statute was "clear and unambiguous and that no action contesting an oil
and gas lease decision shall be maintained unless taken within 90 days." Park County, 613
F. Supp. at 1186. The lower court's decision was based on the rationale that NEPA chal-
lenges can be devastating to the predictability of title, which is precisely what the statute is
intended to guard against. Id. See also Geosearch v. Andrus, 508 F. Supp. 839, 845 (D.
Wyo. 1981).
36. Park County, 817 F.2d at 616 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1982)).
37. Id.
1988]
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Gordon.3 8
i. Jones v. Gordon Analysis
In Jones, an operator of an aquatic zoological park, Sea World, ap-
plied for a permit to capture killer whales for purposes of scientific re-
search and public display.3 9 The Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972 (MMPA) 40 provides authority for such proposed ventures. In May
of 1984, Jones sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service in federal court alleging that the Ser-
vice's issuance of the permit to Sea World without preparation of an EIS
violated NEPA. 4 ' The Service contended that Jones' action was time-
barred by the sixty day statute of limitations found in § 104(d)(6) of the
MMPA, 4 2 since Jones did not file his action until six months after the
Service issued the permit to Sea World.
43
The Ninth Circuit, affirming the lower court's decision, held that
the statute of limitations period set forth in the MMPA does not apply to
NEPA challenges since NEPA itself provides an independent source of
jurisdiction forJones' action.4 4 The court interpreted the statute of lim-
itations in the MMPA to apply to "substantive" elements of the permit
only, and not to the "procedural" requirements of NEPA. 45 Thus, since
Jones' challenge was essentially procedural in nature, the sixty day stat-
ute of limitations did not operate to bar his action.
4 6
By direct analogy to Jones, the Tenth Circuit reasoned in Park County
that the statute of limitations embodied in the MLLA only applied to
"actions contesting either the lease issuance or substantive decisions re-
lating to the lease itself."'4 7 In short, since a NEPA challenge is proce-
dural in nature and does not attack the substantive elements of an oil
and gas lease, the MLLA's provision simply does not apply to NEPA
attacks. Therefore, they held that a NEPA challenge to the issuance of
oil and gas leases on federal forest lands is not subject to the ninety day
statute of limitations found in the MLLA. 48 The court also held the eq-
38. 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 823.
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982). The statute authorizes the Secretary to issue per-
mits for the taking or importation of any marine mammal.
41. Jones, 792 F.2d at 823.
42. Section 104(d)(6) of the MMPA provides that:
Any applicant for a permit, or any party opposed to such permit, may obtain judi-
cial review of the terms and conditions of any permit issued by the Secretary
under this section or of his refusal to issue such a permit. Such review, which
shall be pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 5, may be initiated by filing a petition for
review in the United States District Court for the district wherein the applicant for
a permit resides, or has his principal place of business, or in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, within sixty days after the date on which
such permit is issued or denied. (emphasis added).
16 U.S.C. § 1347(d)(6) (1982).




47. Park County, 817 F.2d at 616.
48. Id. at 616-17.
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uitable doctrine of laches as the sole defense against an untimely NEPA
challenge since NEPA contains no statute of limitations.
49
b. Application of Laches Under NEPA
While the laches doctrine is invoked at the discretion of the trial
court, courts have held that "laches must be invoked sparingly in envi-
ronmental cases because ordinarily the plaintiff will not be the only vic-
tim of alleged environmental damage. A less grudging application of
the doctrine might defeat Congress' environmental policy." '50 With this
qualification in mind, the Tenth Circuit overruled the district court's ap-
plication of laches5 ' in the instant case. By reasoning that the district
court abused its discretion by invoking the doctrine of laches, it held
that the district court failed to explicitly recognize that laches must be
invoked sparingly in NEPA cases in order to protect Congress' environ-
mental policy.
52
Contrary to the district court's ruling, the Tenth Circuit did not per-
ceive Park's tactical decision to fight the APD first rather than the lease
issuance as constituting unreasonable delay. The court stated that evi-
dence of an unreasonable delay in pressing a known claim, coupled with
prejudice to the defendant resulting from such delay, was necessary to
sustain a laches claim. They viewed Park's decision as a tactical maneu-
ver and not as an unreasonable delay causing prejudice to the defend-
ants. The court recognized that because Park was an organization with
limited financial resources, it was forced to pursue the one claim that
could result in the maximum benefit. 53 The two year delay in challeng-
ing the lease issuance was not due to a lack of vigilance, but rather, be-
cause "plaintiffs expected that their strategic decision to focus on the
APD approval would render challenge to the underlying lease issuance
49. Park County, 817 F.2d at 617. In the context of NEPA challenges, there are three
criteria that must be satisfied before laches can be applied: (1) a delay in asserting a right
or a claim; (2) such delay was not excusable; and (3) there was undue prejudice to the
defendants as a result of the delay. Sierra Club v. Cavanaugh, 447 F. Supp. 427, 429 (D.
S.D. 1978).
50. Id. (quoting Preservation Coalition, Inc., v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.
1982)). "[L]aches ... has received a lukewarm reception in suits presenting environmen-
tal questions, for not only will others than the plaintiff suffer the possible adverse environ-
mental effects, but the agency will escape compliance with NEPA, a result not to be
encouraged." Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1324
(8th Cir. 1974).
51. Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1186. The district court was convinced that Park
knowingly delayed the filing of a known claim concerning the lease issuance and that such
delay prejudiced the defendants. Park was aware no later than June 1983, that the North
Fork lease was issued without an EIS and failed to bring an action at that time. Instead,
Park demanded that an EIS be prepared on the North Fork APD even though it was con-
vinced that such APD would never be approved. Once the APD was approved, Park
County reversed its position and brought an action challenging the issuance of the North
Fork lease. Id.
52. Park County, 817 F.2d at 617.
53. Id. at 617-18. The court further added that "[t]he general public, whose interest
plaintiffs essentially represent in environmental cases, should not be penalized for plain-
tiffs decision to pursue the avenue that they thought to be most fruitful in vindicating their
concerns." Id. at 618.
19881
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superfluous."
54
Moreover, the court failed to find that Marathon was prejudiced by
the two year delay.5 5 In determining whether a delay is prejudicial, the
pertinent inquiry is whether substantial work on the project has been
completed before suit is brought.5 6 Here, the North Fork well had been
completed and reclaimed and further drilling under the lease had yet to
transpire. Therefore, the court resolved that preparation of an EIS at
this point in time could still reasonably be expected to ameliorate any
feared environmental damage arising from future lease activities.
5 7
The court did not find that the one million dollar expenditure by
Marathon or the costs incurred by the Environmental Assessment (EA)
and EIS delay constituted prejudice. 58 The use of capital expenditures
in defining prejudice was eroded by the way the court defined the rela-
tionship between laches and NEPA. Specifically, the dispositive issue
seems to be not the amount of dollars spent, but rather what "percent-
age of total costs has already been committed." 5 9 Furthermore, the
court considered any increase in costs due to delay as an irrelevant fac-
tor of prejudice since NEPA, by its very nature, contemplates such
delay.
60
c. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The thirty day period to appeal the lease issuance to the Interior
Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) had long passed when Park lost on the
APD issue.6 1 Hence, since Park could not appeal to the IBLA even if it
had wanted to, the court stated that the administrative process was not
disrupted. Moreover, the Park County court found that the McKart fac-
tors, which are necessary to promote the exhaustion doctrine, were in-
applicable to NEPA cases. 62 McKart presupposes that an administrative
agency possesses expertise beyond that of the courts and that it is there-
54. Park County, 817 F.2d at 618. In the environmental arena, laches will not attach if
(1) the party has made an attempt to make its position known to the agency before filing
suit; (2) the agency makes some response to such request; and (3) physical developments
such as partial construction or drilling have not taken place that would motivate citizens to
investigate the legal basis for challenging the agency's action. Watershed Associates Res-
cue v. Alexander, 586 F. Supp. 978, 984 (1982). In the instant case, the initial challenge to
the APD, rather than the lease itself, constituted Park County's attempt to make its overall
position known to the BLM and Forest Service. Furthermore, absent additional drilling,
there was no immediate physical indication that drilling activity would soon resume.
Hence, the public had no on-the-ground evidence that would motivate their interest to
seek legal redress; thus, the delay associated with pursuing their claim did not constitute
laches.
55. Park County, 817 F.2d at 618.
56. Watershed, 586 F. Supp. 978, 985.
57. Park County, 817 F.2d at 619. For example, in light of more probing information
found in an EIS, as opposed to an environmental assessment, additional lease stipulations
may be devised which could further protect the environment. Id.
58. Id. at 618.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 619. See43 C.F.R. § 4.410-.411 (1986).
62. The McKart factors are: (1) avoidance of premature interruption of the administra-
tive process; (2) deference to bodies possessing expertise in areas outside the conventional
[Vol. 65:4
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fore better qualified to handle the issue affecting that agency's deci-
sion.6" In the NEPA context, however, the Park County court opined that
it was every bit as qualified as the agency to pass judgment on NEPA
claims, and that application of the exhaustion doctrine in this case would
undermine the goal that prompted NEPA's development; therefore, it
concluded that the trial court erred when it applied the exhaustion
doctrine.
64
d. EIS Not Required For Issuance of Oil and Gas Lease
The Park County court upheld the trial court's ruling that the BLM's
lease issuance was not unreasonable. Thus, at the leasing stage, with the
proper stipulatory controls, an EIS was held not to be required. 6 5 The
court found that "the hybrid goal [of the] nation is to encourage the
development of domestic oil and gas production while at the same time
ensuring that such development is undertaken with an eye towards envi-
ronmental concerns." '66 The Park County court stated that the goals of
NEPA must be harmonized with the seemingly divergent views of both
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 197667 (FLPMA) and
the Energy Security Act, 6 8 which "explicitly [establishes] a national pol-
icy to end dependence on foreign energy sources." '69
e. Application of NEPA
NEPA is essentially a procedural statute; it does "not require agen-
cies to elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate consider-
ations."'70 It simply requires that an agency take a "hard look" at the
environmental consequences of any major federal action. 7 1 In the in-
stant case, it is the BLM's and Forest Service's responsibility to deter-
mine whether an EIS is required prior to lease issuance.7 2 To aid in this
determination, the agency is required to prepare an environmental as-
sessment (EA). 7 3 The EA process allows the agency to identify adverse
environmental consequences that may arise from the contemplated op-
experience of judges; (3) recognition of executive and administrative autonomy; and (4)
development of a factual record. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969).
63. Park County, 817 F.2d at 620.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 624. The district court applied an arbitrary and capricious standard to the
agency's decision of whether an EIS must be prepared. Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1186.
See also Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d. 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Hanly
v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1972). However, the
Tenth Circuit used a reasonableness standard when it reviewed the agency's action.
66. Park County, 817 F.2d at 621.
67. 43 U.S.C. § 1701-84 (1982). Section 1701(a)(12) stands for the proposition that
public lands must be managed in a manner which recognizes the nation's need for domes-
tic sources of minerals, food, timber and fiber from public lands.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 8701(b)(1) (1979).
69. Park County, 817 F.2d at 620.
70. Id. (quoting Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983)).
71. Id. (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976)).
72. Id. at 620.
73. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1986).
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eration. If the envisioned environmental harm can be substantially miti-
gated through the use of protective measures and restrictions on lease
activity, this exercise will lead to a Finding of No Significant Impact
("FONSI"), in which case an EIS will not be required. Should such miti-
gating measures fail to satisfy a sufficient number of environmental con-
cerns, however, an EIS will be required.
74
Based on the strength of the EA that was drafted prior to issuance
of the contested lease, 75 the BLM determined that the lease issuance
itself did not warrant prior preparation of an EIS. 76 To determine
whether an EIS should have been prepared, the role of the reviewing
court is a narrow one. Its role is to determine whether it is reasonable
for the BLM and the Forest Service to conclude that "the action under
review will have no significant environmental consequences."-77 The
party challenging the agency's decision "shoulders the burden of estab-
lishing that the FONSI was unreasonable."-78 Finally, in its analysis of
whether an EIS is required under NEPA, the BLM and Forest Service
may properly weigh the mitigating measures it will impose on lease ac-
74. Park County, 817 F.2d at 621. Federal onshore oil and gas leases are issued
through the Department of Interior-BLM pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as
amended in 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-226 (1982). Upon lease issuance, the lessee is entitled to
conduct exploration and/or drilling activities in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the lease, subject to any stipulations attached to the lease. Often, as in this case, special
lease stipulations require approval of activities by the Forest Service, which is the surface
managing agency. If lease offerings affect lands administered by the Forest Service, the
BLM submits them to the Forest Service for review. The Forest Service makes a recom-
mendation whether the lease should be issued and, if so, recommends mitigating measures
in the form of lease stipulations that will control the environmental impacts that may be
caused by lease activity. It is the general practice of the BLM to accept Forest Service
recommendations.
The Forest Service administers responsibility over the EA process. In addition, when
the lessee or its designated operator exercises its rights to drill under the oil and gas lease,
it is required to file a proposed operating plan to the BLM in order to receive an approved
permit to drill. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-1(a) (1986). Environmental documents pursuant to
NEPA are prepared prior to approval of the proposed operations. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1 (a)
(1986). The BLM and Forest Service work in tandem to scrutinize the proposed plan in
light of NEPA and, if appropriate, tailor environmental stipulations allowing the operator
to fulfill his operating plan while minimizing any impact his operations may have on the
environment. Brief for Appellees/Cross Appellants at 5-7, Park County Resource Council
v. Department of Agriculture, 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987).
75. Park County, 817 F.2d at 621. The Forest Service prepared an EA exceeding 100
pages. It evaluated the effects of, and alternatives for, its recommendations on oil and gas
lease offers involving the Shoshone National Forest. The Forest Service opted to recom-
mend lease issuance with appropriate stipulations to protect surface resources. The EA
also recommended against leasing where strict statutory control over operations would be
insufficient to avoid unacceptable irreversible damage to resources. Id.
76. Id. On November 9, 1979, the Regional Forester issued a Finding of No Signifi-
cant Impact ("FONSI"). Hence, its final determination stated that there would be no sig-
nificant impact on the human environment as a result of oil and gas lease issuance under
the stipulations promulgated by the Forest Service. Id.
77. Id. at 621. There is a split among the circuit courts as to the appropriate standard
of review in evaluating whether an agency's determination to forego an EIS should be
overturned. Id. at note 4. The Tenth, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits adhere to
the "reasonableness standard." The First, Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits apply the
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"
standard, as set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). Id.
78. Park County, 817 F.2d at 621 (citing Vieux Carre Property Owners, Residents &
Associates v. Pierce, 719 F.2d 1272, 1279 (5th Cir. 1983)).
[Vol. 65:4
NATURAL RESOURCES
tivity which serve to reduce negative environmental impacts. 79
As a result of these factors, the Park County court held that Park
failed to meet its burden. The Court concluded that the BLM and the
Forest Service took the requisite "hard look" at the environmental con-
sequences of oil and gas leasing, and that the FONSI was "within the
bounds of reasonable decision making.
'"80
The issuance of the oil and gas lease was fundamentally a paper
transaction, that is, the lease issuance itself did not allow the lessee to do
anything. A gamut of environmentally mitigating measures were in
place forcing the lessee to obtain prior federal approval and conduct
futher environmental analysis before carrying out any surface disturbing
activities. 8 ' Hence, the BLM and Forest Service maintained tight con-
trol over future activities. They reserved the right to impose strict modi-
fications, or in the case of threatened or endangered species, disallow
those activities that they considered detrimental.82
Park argued that an EIS must be prepared at the leasing stage be-
cause they were convinced that exploratory drilling would eventually
lead to full field development. 8 3 They argued that if such effects are not
considered at the leasing stage, they could not adequately be addressed
at a later time.8 4 The court noted, however, that there are no definite
foreseeable effects of full field development at the leasing stage. 85 In-
deed, oil and gas exploration statistics prove that one exploratory suc-
cess, let alone full field development, is extremely tentative and
speculative at the leasing stage. 8 6 The court recognized that requiring a
cumulative EIS, which contemplated full field development at the leas-
ing stage, would result in a gross misallocation of resources and would
not provide a useful environmental analysis for major federal actions
that affect the environment.
87
The court added that when an APD for a specific site is proposed,
an EIS evaluating the myriad environmental concerns should be initi-
ated.8 8 The purpose of an EIS can only be fully realized when a project
79. Id.
80. Id. at 622 (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, 462 U.S. 87, 125 (1983)).
81. Id.
82. Id. The court in Park County relied on Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.
1972), where the major issue was whether the lease of Indian land to a corporation consti-
tuted a "federal" action, which would trigger NEPA. Id. In that case the court held that an
EIS was required prior to lease issuance because there were plans to develop the leased
land. The Park County court held that Davis "does not stand for the proposition that an EIS
is required whenever the Federal Government leases land." Park County, 817 F.2d at 622.
83. Park County, 817 F.2d at 622.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 623.
86. Id. Exploration activities take place on only one out of ten federal leases issued
and development activities are conducted on only one of ten of those leases on which
exploration activities have been approved and completed.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 623.
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is proposed not merely contemplated.89 "[T]he project must be of sufficient
definitiveness before an evaluation of its environmental impact can be
made and alternatives proposed."9 0 Otherwise, requiring an EIS at the
leasing stage is like "demanding that the Department specify the prob-
able route of a highway that may never be built from points as yet un-
known over terrain as yet unchartered in conformity with state plans as
yet undrafted. A more speculative exercise can hardly be imagined." 9' 1
4. Conclusion
At first blush it appears the oil and gas industry can claim a victory
in that the BLM is not required to prepare a cumulative EIS prior to
issuance of an onshore federal oil and gas lease, because such action
does not constitute a "major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment."'9 2 This ruling, however, rests on
the tender underpinnings that the reviewing agency reasonably identify
the potential environmental harm arising from speculative lease activi-
ties and that these concerns are adequately embodied in an EA with
companion lease stipulations mitigating any adverse environmental ef-
fects. NEPA contains no statute of limitations, thus leaving the equita-
ble doctrine of laches as the sole remaining affirmative defense available
to the lessee who is forced to defend against a NEPA challenge. 9 3 Since
courts sparingly apply laches to environmental issues raised in the name
of NEPA, the weakness of the laches defense is obvious. This effectively
means that exploration and development plans for federal leases will
remain susceptible to NEPA attack until these activities have been com-
pleted and reclaimed.
II. FEDERAL COAL LEASE READJUSTMENTS
A. Background
The companion cases of Coastal States v. Hodel
9 4 and FMC v. Hodel9 5
dealt with the statutory application of the rules and regulations gov-
erning the leasing of federal coal lands. The primary issues presented to
the Tenth Circuit concerned the timeliness of the Bureau of Land Man-
agement's (BLM) coal lease readjustment practices and the reasonable-
ness of the terms mandated thereunder. The results of these two cases
dramatically change the vested rights conferred upon pre-Federal Coal
Leasing Amendment Act 9 6 leases, a result that will have a far reaching
89. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 454 U.S. 139, 146 (1981) (emphasis in
orginal)).
90. Id. at 624 (quoting Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir.
1971), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 1021 (1972) (emphasis added)).
91. Id. (quoting County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1379
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978)).
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
94. 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987).
95. 816 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987).
96. 30 U.S.C.S. § 207(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
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impact on the mining and development of western federal coal lands.
B. Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel
1. Facts
Coastal States Energy Company (Coastal) owns and operates an un-
derground coal mine in Sevier County, Utah, known as the SUFCO
Mine. 97 In March 1985, the BLM attempted to readjust two federal coal
leases9" owned by Coastal pursuant to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of
1920 (MLLA) 99 and the regulation promulgated thereunder. These two
leases embrace the largest portion of the coal reserves making up the
SUFCO Mine. The two leases, issued pursuant to the MLLA, 10 0 carried
royalty burdens equal to 15 cents per ton of coal mined. 10 '
In accordance with the MLLA, the leases were issued for an indeter-
minate period of time, subject to the BLM's right to reasonably readjust
and fix the terms and conditions of each lease at the end of twenty years
from the date of issuance and thereafter at the end of each succeeding
twenty-year period.10 2 Thus, on September 1, 1981, and February 28,
1982, the two leases in question (the "SL" lease and "U" lease, respec-
tively) were subject to readjustment.
10 3
Two months before the end of the second twenty-year period, the
BLM notified Coastal that it had intended to readjust the SL lease. The
notice did not outline the readjustment terms, but simply stated that the
terms and conditions would be forwarded within two years, and that the
readjustment would take effect sixty days after the anniversary date.'
0 4
Seventeen days after the second twenty-year period had expired, the
BLM sent Coastal a Notice of Proposed Readjustment of Lease, and no-
tified Coastal that it had sixty days in which to file objections to the pro-
97. The SUFCO Mine employs over 250 people. In recent years Coastal has made
capital improvements to the mine in amounts in excess of $33,000,000. To date, the mine
has produced over two million tons of coal, of which 80% of the annual production is
committed and sold pursuant to long term coal supply contracts. The price that Coastal
receives for this coal is directly tied to the royalty it must pay to the federal government
pursuant to the underlying coal lease. Opening Brief for Appellant at 6, Coastal States
Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987).
98. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 12. On September 11, 1941, Coastal's predecessor, Lo-
renzo R. Hansen, as Lessee, entered into coal lease Number SL-062583 (the -SL" Lease)
with the United States. Id. On March 1, 1962, the United States, as Lessor, and Coastal
State's predecessors, Southern Utah Fuel Company and Equipment Rental Service, as Les-
sees, entered into coal lease Number U-062453 (the "U" Lease), Id.
99. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1985).
100. See 30 U.S.C. § 207 (1976) which mandated that each federal lease contain the
following material terms: a royalty of not less than 5 cents per ton of coal mined payable
on a quarterly basis; annual lease rentals topping out at no greater than $1.00 per acre on
the fifth anniversary date; lease term was for an indeterminate period of time conditioned
upon diligent development and continued operations.
101. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 12.
102. 30 U.S.C. § 201-07 (1976).
103. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 12.
104. Id. See also BLM Instruction Memorandum No. 80-463 (April 17, 1980) requiring
that such notices be sent to lessee at least 120 days prior to the end of the current twenty
year period.
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posed terms or surrender the lease.' 0 5
In similar fashion Coastal received a readjustment notice from the
BLM affecting the U lease. Two months prior to the U lease's twenty-
year anniversary, specific readjustment terms were proposed.
10 6
The Secretary proposed the readjustment of several lease provi-
sions '0 7 similar for both leases, mandating an increase in the royalty rate
from 15 cents per ton to 8% of the value of the coal removed by under-
ground mining methods. 10 8 Coastal, objecting to the proposed read-
justments, made a timely protest to the BLM. The BLM refused to
amend the proposed readjustments, forcing Coastal to appeal the
BLM's decision to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA).' 0 9 The
IBLA affirmed the BLM's decision,' 10 after which Coastal appealed to
the Federal District Court for the District of Utah, challenging both the
readjustments and the underlying regulations and policies upon which
they were grounded."I ' The district court entered summary judgment
in favor of the BLM, holding that: "(1) [the] readjustment process was
not required to be completed prior to end of lease term; (2) the Federal
Coal Leasing Amendments Act (FCLAA) royalty provisions apply to re-
adjustments of a pre-FCLAA lease; and (3) the regulations (underlying
the BLM's action) were valid."' 12 Coastal appealed this adverse deci-
sion to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.' '3 Judge McWilliams af-
firmed the lower court's decision and ruled that (1) the coal lease
readjustments were timely and (2) that the FCLAA applies to pre-
FCLAA leases.' 1
4
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The two principle issues presented on appeal were (1) whether the
BLM preserved the right to formally readjust the leases after the expira-
tion of the twenty year anniversary date by serving Coastal with a notice
of intent to readjust the coal leases before the expiration of their twenty
year anniversary date, and (2) whether Section 6 of the FCLAA, and the
regulations and policies promulgated thereunder should apply to pre-
FCLAA leases on their anniversary dates.' 
5
105. Id. Coastal filed its objections with the BLM regarding the SL lease on November
24, 1981.
106. Id.
107. In addition to the royalty readjustment the BLM had proposed readjusting the
following terms: (I) increase in the bonding requirement from $3,000 to $450,000; (2)
change in royalty payments from monthly to quarterly; and (3) the deletion of the right ,to
credit rental payments against royalty payments. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 12-13.
108. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 12.
109. Id. at 13.
110. 70 I.B.L.A. 386 (Feb. 9, 1983).
111. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 13.
112. Id. at 9.
113. Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987).




a. Timeliness of the Readjustment
Coastal reasserted it's argument made in the district court, that for
readjustment to be effective, the terms of the readjustment must be final
before the end of the leases' twenty-year anniversary period., 16 The
Department of Interior took the contrary position, that final readjust-
ment is effective so long as the BLM sends a notice of intent to readjust
to the coal lessee prior to the end of the twenty years.' 17 Both parties
claimed that Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrews I 18 is controlling.
i. The Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of the
Rosebud Decision
In Rosebud, the Tenth Circuit held that the BLM's attempt to read-
just the terms and conditions of a coal lease was unlawful, when the
notice of intent to readjust was provided two and one half years after
expiration of the lease's twenty-year period.' 19 The Rosebud court, how-
ever, did not address the issue of whether filing a notice of intent to
readjust prior to expiration of the twenty year period preserved the right
to readjust the lease after expiration of such time. ' 20 In the instant case,
however, the district court, by relying heavily on the Tenth Circuit's
contemporaneous decision in FMC v. Hodel, 12 1 expanded the rationale
of Rosebud. It declared that "[a]ll Rosebud required was that Notice of
Readjustment be given on or before the Twenty-year anniversary date of
the lease," to preserve the Secretary's right to readjust.' 2 2 The district
court claimed that its finding was consistent with the MLLA, the FCLAA
(1976) and the language embodied in the leases themselves.
The MLLA, as amended by the FCLAA (1976) establishes the
framework by which the government must abide in the leasing of federal
coal lands to private parties. The statute, as amended, vests the Secre-
tary of the Interior with the right to readjust the terms and conditions of
a coal lease at the end of the lease's anniversary period.' 2 3 Coastal ar-
gued that the phrase, "at the end of" such period, is unambiguous and
must be afforded its plain meaning, which required the readjustment to
be final at the end of the twenty-year period for it to be effective.12 4 The
district court, however, found Coastal's statutory interpretation too nar-
row and unconvincing. The court insisted that such interpretation is
subject to the examination of all relevant statutes and regulations
116. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 13.
117. Id.
118. 667 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1982).
119. Id. The court emphasized that it was not "difficult to reach the conclusion that the
readjustment was to be when each twenty-year period expired, on that date and not at a
later time." It concluded that the statement of time " 'at the end of' on its face is not
susceptible to any variation as it is a precise time." Id. at 951.
120. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 13.
121. 816 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987). See also infra notes 159-91 and accompanying text.
122. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 13 (quoting Gulf Oil v. Clark, 631 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.M.
1985)).
123. 30 U.S.C.A. § 207 (Law. Co-op. 1971).
124. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 13.
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promulgated thereunder. Since there are numerous regulations gov-
erning the readjustment process, the district court concluded that the
requirements of these regulations created a readjustment process as op-
posed to requiring the BLM to readjust the leases in a single act. 125 As a
result, the otherwise plain meaning of the word "at" as interpreted in
Rosebud has turned from a particular point in time, to an entire period of
time required for readjustment.
ii. Reasonableness of the Coal Leasing Regulations
Coastal next attacked the reasonableness of the regulation process
that had been established to accomplish the mandated readjustments.
As authorized in the MLLA, the Secretary promulgated regulations that
implemented the specifics of the FCLAA. This resulted in the installa-
tion of a comprehensive procedure whereby the Secretary would be re-
quired to notify the lessee, prior to the expiration of the twenty-year
lease term or any succeeding ten-year period thereafter, of whether
readjusted terms would be made prior to the end of such period.
12 6 If
the Secretary fails to notify the lessee of its intent to readjust, this shall
be deemed a waiver of its right to readjust for the ensuing lease pe-
riod. 127 The regulations further provide that the Notice to Readjust
must inform the lessee when the specific terms will be transmitted, and
that such transmission must be done within two years upon receipt of
notice. If the BLM fails to comply within this two year period it waives
its right to readjust. 128 Finally, the regulation scheme allows the lessee
a sixty-day period following receipt of the readjusted terms to lodge an
objection thereto with the IBLA.'
2 9
Coastal asserted that the foregoing regulations must be set aside
because they were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and
otherwise not in accordance with law."' 3 0 The court analyzed the rea-
sonableness of the regulations by the standards set out by the Adminis-
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id.. at 14. See 30 U.S.C. § 207 (1976). See also 43 C.F.R. § 3451.1(a)(1) (1981)
(which subjects the two leases to readjustment at the end of their current twenty year
period and at the end of each ten year period thereafter).
127. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 14. See also 43 C.F.R. § 3451(d)(1) (1981) which states
that: "[t]he Secretary shall, prior to the expiration of the current or initial twenty year
period or any succeeding ten year period thereafter, notify the lessee of any lease which
becomes subject to readjustment after June 1, 1980, whether any readjustment of terms
and conditions will be made prior to the expiration of the initial twenty year period or any
succeeding ten year period thereafter. On such a lease the failure to so notify the lessee
shall mean that the United States is waving its right to readjust the lease for the readjust-
ment period in question." Id. The BLM sent Coastal notice, required by this Section, 63
days prior to the end of the second year period of the SL Lease and well in advance of the
end of the initial twenty year period of the U Lease. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 12.
128. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 14. See 43 C.F.R. § 3451.1(d)(2) (1981).
129. Id. at 14-15. See 43 C.F.R. § 3451.1 (1981).
130. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 17. Coastal asserts that the Secretary violated the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act, which in pertinent part required the Court to "hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, and
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .... (C) in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; [or] (D) without obser-
vance of procedure required by statues." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982).
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trative Procedures Act (APA). 13 1 A regulation is considered arbitrary
and capricious only if the agency relied on factors which were not in-
tended by Congress or if it failed to consider the crucial aspects of the
problem, or issued a decision so implausible as to defy reality.' 3 2 The
court found the BLM's regulations to be consistent with the APA and
accordingly held that the regulations were not arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of agency discretion.' 3 3 "Congress has authorized the Secre-
tary to 'prescribe necessary and proper rules and regulations to carry
out and accomplish the purposes of the Act of 1920."134 Since Con-
gress failed to define the procedures by which readjustment was to take
place, the regulations established by the BLM setting forth those proce-
dures are within the BLM's authority so long as the regulations are not
contradictory to the MLLA.1 35 Furthermore, the recognized policy of
the FCLAA was "to provide a more orderly procedure for the leasing
and development of coal presently owned by the United States and to
assure its development in a manner compatible with public interest."1
36
The court concluded that the regulations promulgated by the Secretary
were consistent with the goals of the MLLA, and therefore they were
within the bounds of the Secretary's authority.'
37
In Rosebud, the court concluded that the plain meaning of "at the
end of" each twenty year period was clear, that "it is a precise point in
time and not susceptible to any other meaning."' 3 8 By adopting the
lower courts analysis, as discussed above, the Tenth Circuit in essence
transformed this "precise time" into a continuum whereby the process
of readjustment may take place over a period of time, provided that the
process begins before the end of the lease period.' 3 9
b. Application of FCLAA to Pre-FCLAA Leases
Citing section 7 of the MLLA the court noted that "leases shall be
for an indeterminate period . . . upon the further condition that at the
end of each twenty-year period succeeding the date of the lease such
readjustment of terms and conditions may be made as the Secretary of
Interior may determine, unless otherwise provided by law at the expiration of
such periods."' 40 The court, relying heavily on FMC, '41 interpreted this
131. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
132. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 17-18.
133. Id. at 17. The court concluded that the APA Standard was satisfied since the BLM
complied with the Act by publishing the challenged regulations for comment and incorpo-
rating some of the comments received in the final regulation. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 505. In
fact, the district court noted that Coastal did not object to the challenged rule when pro-
posed. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 16.
134. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 18.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting H.R. REi,. No. 681, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, repintedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1943).
137. Id. at 19.
138. Id. 667 F.2d at 951.
139. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 505.
140. 41 Stat. 437 § 207 (1920).
141. 817 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987).
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language to mean that Congress empowered the Secretary with the right
to impose any new lease term or condition, no matter how broad or wide
sweeping those changes might be, at the readjustment stage of the sub-
ject leases. 14 2 The Tenth Circuit conceded this was a very broad author-
ity, subject only to the stipulation "unless otherwise provided by law
.... '143 The Tenth Circuit, departing from the trial court, recognized
that this language required the statutes in effect at the time of readjust-
ment to be incorporated into the leases. 144 Hence, at readjustment
time, the Secretary was required to readjust the leases in conformity
with the FCLAA.
145
Close examination of the court's interpretation of the FCLAA
reveals that the FCLAA transformed the lessee's lease from an indeter-
minate term coal lease to one with a finite period, which will expire
when commercial production ceases. Coastal argued that such a change
would undermine the fundamental character of the lessee's vested prop-
erty rights, a result they concluded, was not intended by Congress when
it enacted the FCLAA. 146 Furthermore, by applying the FCLAA to pre-
FCLAA leases, Coastal asserted that such statutory application served to
interfere with Coastal's antecedent rights, thus giving the statute retro-
active effect.1 4 7 Coastal relied on the general proposition that such ret-
roactive application of the FCLAA must be supported by explicit
"unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms [of the statute] and the
manifest intention of the legislature."' 14 8 Coastal claimed the govern-
ment failed to make such necessary showing in this case. The district
court concurred with Coastal's argument, however, it did not view the
application of the FCLAA to pre-FCLAA leases as interfering with ante-
cedent rights through retroactive application.' 49 To the contrary, the
district court asserted that the Secretary "specifically reserved the power
to readjust the leases, both in the leases themselves and in the Act of
1920, as amended."' 50 The district court concluded, and the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed, that the powers granted to the Secretary by Congress in
no way altered the rights that the original leases gave to Coastal.'
5'
i. The Eight Percent Royalty
The MLLA of 1920 set the minimum royalty rate at five cents per
142. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 505.
143. Id.
144. Id. The trial court determined that 'the unless otherwise provided by law' lan-
guage only allows the Secretary to readjust leases "unless the law in effect at the time of
readjustment has taken that right away." Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 20. The Tenth Circuit
interpreted the same language to mean that the Secretary was required to base readjust-
ments according to the law in effect at the time of readjustment. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 506.
145. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 506.
146. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 20.
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Union Pacific v. Larimie, 231 U.S. 190 at 199 (1913)).
149. Id. at 20-21.
150. Id. at 21.
151. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 506.
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ton. 1 52 This rate was increased by the FCLAA to not less than 8% of the
value of the coal removed from an underground mine, subject to the
proviso that the BLM may select a lesser amount, but in no case less
than 5%.153 The BLM argued that this regulation required the imposi-
tion of the 8% royalty rate at readjustment time and that a lower rate
could not be considered. 15 4 It further asserted that Coastal, if finding
the 8% rate excessive, could file application for relief under Section 39
of the MLLA.' 5 5 Coastal rebutted the BLM's argument asserting that
the regulations required the imposition of the 5% rate as the authorized
minimum royalty rate.' 56 The district court affirmed the BLM's position
that the 8% rate was the reasonable minimum rate. 15 7 The Tenth Cir-
cuit aligned itself with the district court's analysis, with one minor depar-
ture. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Secretary, prior to installing
an 8% rate, must take into consideration conditions that would justify
the imposition of the lower 5% rate. 158
C. FMC v. Hodel
1. Facts
Unlike the mining operation in Coastal States 159 the two leases at
issue here make up a surface coal mine near Kemmerer, Wyoming,
known as the Skull Point Mine. 16 0 Both leases were issued in March,
152. Supra note 100 and accompanying text.
153. C.F.R. § 3473.3-2(a)(3) (1979).
154. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 506.
155. Id. See 60 Stat. 957 (1946), reprinted in 30 U.S.C. § 209 (1982). This section allows
the Secretary to reduce or waive a royalty rate whenever he judges it necessary in order to
promote development or allow the lessee to successfully operate. The royalty readjust-
ment period is limited to a maximum of three years. Furthermore, the royalty relief may
be terminated at the annual evaluation period or upon transfer of lease ownership.
Coastal, 816 F.2d at 536 n.7.
156. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 507. Coastal relied on the underground readjustment royalty
regulations promulgated by the Secretary, primarily 43 C.F.R. § 3451.1 (a)(2) (1976)
which states: "[any lease subject to readjustment which contains a royalty rate less than
the minimum royalty prescribed in § 3473.3-2 of this title shall be readjusted to conform
to the minimum prescribed in that Section." They also relied on Section 3473.3-2(a)(1)
which provides in pertinent part that: "[r]oyalty rates shall be determined on an individual
basis prior to the lease issuance . . . " and Section 3473.3-2(a)(3) which states: "[a] lease
shall require payment of a royalty of not less than 8% of the value of the coal removed
from an underground mine, except that the authorized officer may determine a lesser
amount, but in no case less than 57 if conditions warrant." Coastal, 816 F.2d at 507 (emphasis
added).
157. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 507.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 502 (10th Cir. 1987).
160. The two coal leases are lease W-061421 and lease W-061422. FMC has spent
millions of dollars to produce coal from its mine. The majority of its production fuels
FMC's Kemmerer coal generated electrical facility and Green River Trona plant. In fact,
FMC spent in excess of $70 million converting its Trona Plant from natural gas to coal
generation. The balance of FMC's production is sold under spot purchase orders and
long term contracts. In addition, the mine is classified as one of only two mines in the
country (the other being Pittsburgh & Midway's mine directly adjoining and in direct com-
petition with FMC's mine) as a special bituminous coal mine. This classification is awarded
to mines when the cost of extracting coal increases over the life of the mine and the mine is
therefore exempt from certain reclamation standards. FMC v. Watt, 587 F. Supp. at 1546
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1963, pursuant to the MLLA and "called for a royalty payment of 17 1/2
cents per ton of coal while providing for periodic readjustment of the
terms and conditions of the lease at twenty year intervals."'
16 1
The twenty year anniversary date for both leases was March, 1983,
some seven years following the enactment of the FCLAA.16 2 The BLM
sent FMC actual notice 16 3 of its intent to readjust, and a petition of the
specific proposed terms and conditions prior to the twenty year anniver-
sary of the leases. 164 The readjusments increased the royalty rate from
the present 17 1/2 cents per ton to 12 1/2% of the value of the coal
mined. 16 5 FMC objected to the timeliness and substance of the pro-
posed terms.' 6 6 On administrative appeal the Interior Board of Land
Appeal (IBLA) upheld the BLM's judgment that the royalty readjust-
ment was timely and that the adjusted terms were lawful. 16 7 FMC filed a
petition for review in the United States District Court for Wyoming.16
8
The IBLA's decision was affirmed in part, and reversed in part, by the
district court. The court held that the readjustment was timely but un-
lawful. 169 Both parties appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Judge McWilliams held that the royalty readjustment was both timely
and lawful. 17
0
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Like Coastal before it, the central issues on appeal in FMC con-
cerned whether (1) the BLM waived its right to readjust FMC's leases for
failure to provide final readjusted terms within the anniversary deadline,
and (2) whether the FCLAA should be applied to pre-FCLAA leases on
their post-FCLAA anniversary dates. 17'
a. Timeliness of Readjustment
FMC argued that readjustment occurs when the BLM issues its final
decision and the lessee is made aware of what the terms and conditions
will be. ' 72 FMC based its position on its interpretation of Section 7 of
the MLLA.17 3 FMC took the position that under the MLLA, a final BLM
decision to readjust terms and conditions of a coal lease cannot take
(1984); see also Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1277
(1977).
161. FMC v. Hodel, 816 F.2d at 498 (10th Cir. 1987).
162. Id.
163. FMC received the BLM's notice on August 23, 1982. FMC, 587 F. Supp. at 1546.
164. Id. The actual new terms were proposed by the BLM on December 22, 1982.
165. FMC, 816 F.2d at 498. This is a royalty increase of over 1,000%. See FMC, 587 F.
Supp. at 1548.
166. Id.
167. 74 I.B.L.A. 389 (1983).
168. FMC, 816 F.2d at 498.
169. FMC v. Watt, 587 F. Supp. 1584 (1984).
170. FMC, 816 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987).
171. Id. at 499-500.




effect when the terms are set after the anniversary date.' 74 Here, the
final terms occurred thirty seven days after the lease's anniversary
date. 17 5 Thus, argued FMC, since the readjustment of the existing
leases did not occur at the end of twenty years after the date of the leases,
as required by the MLLA and the leases themselves, the readjustment
was void. '
76
The BLM argued that so long as it sends notice to the lessee of its
intent to readjust a lease prior to the twenty-year anniversary date, it
reserves the right to establish final readjusted terms at a later date, and
that such practice is in compliance with both the statute and the lan-
guage of the leases.1 77 As in Coastal States, both parties placed reliance
on Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrews.1
78
i. Rosebud Revisited
As previously stated, in Rosebud the anniversary date of readjust-
ment was April, 1975.179 However, no notice of any type was sent to the
lessee until two and a half years after the expiration of the second
twenty-year lease period. Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit
found that such a belated adjustment attempt was "untimely and
thereby barred."' 8 0 However, the Tenth Circuit in the instant case
strongly suggested that its Rosebud holding incorporates the notion that if
the BLM sends a Notice of Intent to readjust the terms and conditions of
a coal lease "on or shortly before the 20-year anniversary period" such
notice operates to preserve the BLM's rights under the MLLA and the
language of the lease to readjust the terms in a reasonable fashion
thereafter. 181
b. Application of FCLAA to Pre-FCLAA Leases
The district court found that the BLM's application of Section 6 of
the FCLAA (specifically the 12 1/2% royalty mandated therein) to
FMC's leases was "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion."
18 2
It conceded that the 12 1/2% royalty rate is now a statutory minimum.
But it stopped short of applying it to pre-FCLAA leases by recognizing
that such application would abrogate the provision of the leases which
provides for reasonable readjustment. 1 83 The district court viewed the
imposition of a 1,000% royalty increase imposed without any inquiry
into the factual basis supporting such an increase as arbitrary and as




176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. 667 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1982).
179. Id. at 950.
180. Id. at 953.
181. FMC, 816 F.2d at 500.
182. FMC, 587 F. Supp. at 1547.
183. Id. at 1549.
184. The district court noted that the method for readjustment applied to pre-FCLAA
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The Tenth Circuit found the district court's judgment untenable in
light of its interpretation of the MLLA and the language in the leases.
The court construed the statute and the lease language to mean that the
Secretary may fix "such a new royalty rate as he, or she, may determine
is proper, unless the law in effect at the expiration of such twenty-year
period provides differently."' 8 5 Thus, the court concluded that, the
Secretary had no choice but to impose the 12 1/2% royalty rate, since it
was the rate mandated by law at the readjustment period. 18 6 Implicit in
the court's analysis is that the statutory language not only militates
against the use of the language in the lease calling for reasonable read-
justment, but actually subordinates this reasonableness requirement to
the "unless otherwise provided by law" language found in Section 7 of
the MLLA.
187
c. Retroactive Application of FCLAA
FMC argued, and the district court agreed, that "mandatory appli-
cation of the 12 1/2% royalty rate to pre-existing leases, without factual
evaluation is retroactive application of the provision, which everyone
concedes was not intended and is not proper." 18 8 The district court
opined that readjustment of an existing lease is not a new event, rather it
is part of the inherent process of the original lease, and to mandatorily
apply a 12 1/2% royalty rate materially altered the original term of the
lease. 189 No such expressed intent can be found in the FCLAA. 190 The
Tenth Circuit found no merit to FMC's argument or the district court's
ruling. It concluded that the Secretary clearly had the right to set new
terms on the readjustment date and that it is not retroactive application
of FCLAA to set new terms in accordance with existing law. 19 1
C. Conclusion
The implications of Coastal States 192 and FMC 193 deserve closer at-
leases called for the construction of an evidentiary basis based on an individual analysis of
each coal lease up for readjustment. Items analyzed by the BLM with regard to pre-
FCLAA cases included: (1) the "existence of a competitive bituminous coal mine which is
not subject to readjustment and, therefore, the allegedly mandatory 12 1/2% royalty rate
could not be applied until 1998; [and (2)] the very nature of plaintiff's mine, which pre-
sumably will be forced to produce less coal as a 12 1/2% royalty rate contributes to mak-
ing the costs of mining prohibitive." FMC, 587 F. Supp. at 1548.
185. FMC, 816 F.2d at 501.
186. Id.
187. The court discounts the harsh economic realities caused by the readjustment by
shifting the burden to Congress. FMC, 816 F.2d at 501.
188. FMC, 587 F. Supp. at 1548 (emphasis supplied). The district court based its hold-
ing on Rosebud wherein the court concluded that "[tihe Section 7 amendment provided for
a primary term and also for the royalty to be not less than 12.5%. There is no suggestion
whatever that the amendment was to be retroactive and the contrary is indicated." Id.
(quoting Rosebud 667 F.2d at 952).
189. FMC, 587 F. Supp. at 1548.
190. 30 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
191. FMC, 816 F.2d at 502.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 496.
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tention and further judicial review.
Coal mining is a unique business. It often takes more than ten years
to move a mine from the exploration stage, through the permitting pro-
cess, to actual development. This process requires the expenditure of
millions of dollars before one ton of coal can be mined. To justify this
expenditure, long term coal sales contracts must be secured. These
contracts serve to provide a stable and assured fuel supply for the pri-
mary end user and a predictable and assured market for the miner. The
long term sales contracts, coupled with the long term nature of pre-
FCLAA leases, provided the miner with the necessary confidence and
security upon which to undertake the large capital investment required
for the successful development of the large, often remote, federal coal
reserves.
Congress, aware of the unique nature of the coal business, deliber-
ately provided for indeterminate term leases so that coal companies
would have a reliable and a stable estate upon which to plan their invest-
ments. 19 4 Now, as a result of Coastal States and FMC, the lessee's estate
has been transformed from an indeterminate term lease to a much lesser
defeasible interest: one which makes coal production a condition prece-
dent to the continuation of that interest. Moreover, the 1,000% in-
crease levied against the leases is repugnant to the notion of reasonable
predictability of lease adjustments envisioned by Congress and bar-
gained for by the lessees when they entered into the coal lease contract.
The courts claimed that retroactive adjustment was not employed in
these cases; 1 9 5 the results of the application of FCLAA to pre-FCLAA
leases, however, suggests otherwise.
III. ANTECEDENT TRIBAL CLAIMS UNDER THE INDIAN TRIBAL CLAIMS
COMMISSION ACT
A. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico
196
1. Overview
The principle established in this case is quite simple: all Indian
claims, regardless of their nature, that accrued before 1946 and which
were not lodged with the Indian Claims Commission by 1951 are for-
ever barred. In the instant case, the Navajo Tribe lost its only remedy
available under the law because of the timeliness of their action in ac-
cordance with the Indian Claims Compensation Act (ICCA).
19 7
194. The legislative history of the MLLA suggests that Congress chose indeterminate
coal leases and phosphate leases primarily to satisfy what Congress perceived to be a
greater need for reliability of investment in coal mines and phosphate plants. See 51 CONG.
REC. 14,945 (Sept. 12, 1914).
195. FMC, 816 F.2d at 500.
196. 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987).
197. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. State of N.M., 809 F.2d 1455, 1470-71 (10th Cir. 1987).
Indian Claims Commission Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946) (formerly
codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 70-70V (1976)) (omitted from current code because
Indian Claims Commission terminated on September 30, 1978).
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2. Facts
Executive Order Number 709 (Original Order),19 8 issued by Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt, conveyed 1.9 million acres of land to the Nav-
ajo Tribe, augmenting the original Navajo Reservation as established by
the Treaty of 1868. Subsequently, discoveries revealed that the bounda-
ries of the reservation created by the Original Order intruded upon the
boundary of theJicarilla Apache Reservation. President Roosevelt recti-
fied the problem by issuing Executive Order Number 744 (Amendatory
Order), 199 which redefined the lands granted under the Original Order.
Both Executive Orders were designed to create temporary reservations
of land (allotted lands) which were to be assigned to and occupied by
qualified individual Navajo tribal members.
20 0
Within five months following the issuance of the Amendatory Or-
der, Congress enacted section twenty-five of the Act of 1908201 which
authorized the President to return all unalloted parcels to the public do-
main when he was satisfied that all qualified Navajo tribal members had
been settled. 20 2 In December of 1908, President Roosevelt exercised
the authority granted under the this Act and issued Executive Order
1,000 (Final Order), 20 3 restoring to the public domain for further dispo-
198. The Order states:
It is hereby ordered that the following-described tract of country in the Territo-
ries of Arizona and New Mexico, viz: [description of metes and bounds] is hereby,
withdrawn from sale and settlement and set apart for the use of the Indians as an
addition to the present Navajo Reservation: Provided, That this withdrawal shall
not affect any existing valid rights of any person.
Exec. Order No. 709 (1907) reprinted in H.R. 1663, 60th Cong., Ist Sess., 2 (1908).
199. The Order states:
Whereas it is found that the Executive order of November 9, 1907, setting apart
certain lands in Arizona and New Mexico as an addition to the Navajo Indian
Reservation, conflicts in part with Executive order of November I1, 1907, setting
apart certain lands as an addition to theJicarilla Indian Reservation, N. Mex., said
Executive order is hereby so amended that the description of the tract of land set
apart as an addition to the Navajo Reservation shall read as follows: [description
of metes and bounds].
Exec. Order No. 744 (1907), reprinted in H.R. 1663, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1908).
200. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1458-59.
201. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, 35 Stat. 444 at 457.
202. This legislation was in direct response to the concerns of non-Indian settlers who
believed the Indians would hold the land for tribal purposes too long. Navajo, 809 F.2d at
1458. The Act of 1908 provided in pertinent part:
That whenever the President is satisfied that all the Indians in any part of the
Navajo Indian Reservation in New Mexico and Arizona created by Executive Or-
ders [709/744] have been allotted, the surplus lands in such part of the reserva-
tion shall be restored to the public domain and opened to settlement and entry by
proclamation of the President.
Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, 35 Stat. 444 at 457.
203. Executive Order Number 1,000 (1908) states:
It is hereby ordered that the unallotted lands in Tps. 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 N.,Rs.
5, 6, 7, and 8 W., and Tps. 22 and 23 N., Rs. 6, 7, and 8 W. of the New Mexico
principal meridian, withdrawn from sale and settlement and set apart for the use
of the Indians as an addition to the Navajo Reservation by Executive orders dated
November 9, 1907, and January 28, 1908, be, and the same are hereby, restored
to the public domain, except the following-described lands, embracing 110 unap-
proved allotments, namely: [description of land].
Exec. Order No. 1000 (1908).
Subsequent to Executive Order 1000, President Taft issued Executive Order 1284 on
620 [Vol. 65:4
NATURAL RESOURCES
sition, unallotted lands within the reservation created by the Original
Order and as amended by the Amendatory Order.
20 4
Following the enactment of the ICCA of August 13, 1946,205 the
Navajo Tribe filed a claim seeking compensation under section two of
the ICCA for the cession of its lands, which included the lands defined
in the Original Order and Amendatory Order, under the Treaty ofJune
1, 1868.206 The Tribe successfully argued that it held aboriginal title to
the subject lands at the time of the 1868 Treaty and that the United
States had paid an unconscionably low price for the land. 20 7 As a result
of the complaint, the United States Court of Claims awarded the Nav-
ajo's $14.8 million for the loss sustained.
20 8
Thereafter, the Tribe brought this second action in October 1982,
in the Federal District Court of New Mexico, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the Tribe held equitable title to the unallotted lands that were
added to the Navajo reservation by the Original and Amendatory Or-
ders and that the United States breached its fiduciary duty to the Tribe
by prematurely restoring the lands to the public domain. 20 9 The district
court dismissed the Tribe's complaint, holding that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the case because the Tribe's claim against the
United States accrued prior to 1946 and, thus, fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Indian Claims Commission. 2 10 At the same time, the
Court dismissed the complaint of the private defendants. The Tribe ap-
pealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Mc-
Kay, writing for the court, held that: (1) the Tribe's claim was cognizable
exclusively under the ICCA; (2) the Tribe's claim was compensable only
by money damages; (3) the claim was barred by the statute of limitations
under the ICCA; and (4) the district court properly dismissed the action
January 16, 1911, restoring the remaining unallotted lands in that reservation to the public
domain. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, 35 Stat. 457.
204. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1459. This order was issued in spite of the fact that over one-
half of the eligible Navajo allottees had not received allotments. Id.
205. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. Prior to enactment of the ICCA, Indian
tribes could not litigate claims against the United States. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1460.
Although the Court of Claims was available to hear claims against the United States, Con-
gress specifically excluded from that court's jurisdiction the power to hear Indian claims
based on treaties. Id. See, Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765 at 767. "The ICCA
confined the Commission's jurisdiction to tribal claims that accurred before its 1946 enact-
ment, while it conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to adjudicate any tribal claim
accruing after 1946 that would be cognizable in the Court of Claims if the claimant were
not an Indian tribe." Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1460. Further, Congress limited the period for
filing claims to five years. The ICCA further provided that the Commission was to be
dismantled 10 years after its creation. Due to the Commission's enormous case load, how-
ever, the period to hear pre-1946 claims was extended several times until 1978. Id. at
1461.
206. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 23 Ind. Cl. Comm. 244 (1970).
207. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1461-62.
208. Id. at 1462.
209. Id.
210. Id. In addition, the district court held that, as to the remaining defendants,
"under Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the action could not proceed
against them in the absence of the United States as grantor of the patents through which
those defendants derive title." Id. at 1462-63.
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against the private defendants. 2 11
3. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The primary issue addressed by the Tenth Circuit Court was
whether the Tribe's claim fell within section 12 of the ICCA. If the claim
did qualify as a section 12 action, the district court then lacked jurisdic-
tion over the action against the United States, since the statute of limita-
tions had expired under the ICCA. 2 12 Second, the Tenth Circuit had to
determine whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing
all remaining defendants pursuant to Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Since the United States was deemed an indispensable
party, it could not be joined and without it the action could not
proceed.
2 13
a. "Claim" as Defined Under the Indian Claims Commission Act
The Tribe argued that the district court erred by categorizing the
Tribe's action as a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICCA,
rendering the action susceptible to the statute of limitations in said
Act. 2 14 The Tribe claimed that its title to the land reserved, under the
Original and Amendatory Orders, was never extinguished because the
President breached the fiduciary requirement not to return the lands to
the public domain until the allotment process had been completed. 2 15
Based on this argument the Tribe interpreted the word "claim," within
the meaning of ICCA, to mean exclusively a demand for money for its
land.2 16 In other words, since "the Commission was only authorized to
award money damages for extinguishment of title to Indian lands, this
suit, which seeks to establish the Tribe's existing title to land, could not
have been entertained before the Commission. '2 17 Finding the Tribe's
argument unpersuasive and that the action did indeed fall under the
ICCA the district court dismissed the complaint against the United
States for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2 18 The basis of the district
court's holding was derived primarily from Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge
Indian Reservation v. United States2 19 and Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Homestake
Mining Co.
2 2 0
The Oglala cases resolved issues directly on point with those issues
appealed in Navajo Tribe. In Oglala I, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed a $17.1 million award to the Sioux Nation for the "taking" of
211. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1463.
212. Id. at 1470.
213. Id. at 1471. The remaining defendants were the State of New Mexico, Santa Fe
Mining, Norman Ashcroft, Fernandez Company, and Don R. Smouse.





219. 650 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982) [hereinafter Oglala
I].
220. 722 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1983).
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the Black Hills of South Dakota which were decreed as part of their res-
ervation by an 1877 Act.22 1 Following the decision, the Oglala filed suit
against several parties including the United States seeking restoration of
the lands for which the Sioux Nation received compensation. The Sioux
Nation argued that the 1877 Act was unconstitutional and, therefore,
void. 2 22 The district court dismissed the Oglala's action against the
United States for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the
action against the private defendants after concluding that the United
States was an indispensable party. 22 3 In upholding the district court's
decision, the Eighth Circuit held that the ICCA created a "one time,
exclusive forum" for the resolution of pre-1946 Indian Treaty claims.
2 24
Although the ICCA's awards are limited to money damages, the court
nonetheless determined that "Oglala's action to quiet title, 'as an Indian
claim accruing before 1946 and arising under the constitution, [came]
within [the] exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian Claims
Commission.' "
2 25
Based on the persuasive authority presented by the Oglala cases,
the court readily adopted the principle that the ICCA bars any action
against the United States or third parties seeking the return of tribal
lands that were allegedly taken from the Tribe by the unlawful conduct
of the United States prior to 1946. The Tribe also argued that the ex-
clusive jurisdiction provision of the ICCA should only apply to the them
if it was seeking monetary damages as opposed to the return of its lands.
The court found this argument untenable, since the ICCA was enacted
specifically to provide a remedy for all possible accrued claims existing
before its passage.
2 2 6
In addition, the Tribe attempted to escape the exclusivity of the
ICCA by distinguishing its claim from the one asserted in Oglala I and H.
The Tribe asserted that unlike Oglala I and II, which were predicated on
the unconstitutional taking for which the Tribe had already received
compensation, the instant case was one where the Navajo's title was
never extinguished and, therefore, its cause of action did not raise the
unconstitutional taking issue. 22 7 In essence, the Tribe argued that un-
constitutional takings claims are not cognizable under the ICCA. The
221. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1463. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 220 Ct. Cl. 442, 601
F.2d 1057 (1979), aft'd, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
222. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1463. See Oglala 1, 650 F.2d at 141-42.
223. Id. See Oglala 1, 650 F.2d at 143-44.
224. Oglala 1, 650 F.2d at 143.
225. Vavajo, 809 F.2d at 1464 (quoting Oglala I, 650 F.2d at 143). The Oglala I1 case
involved an action against a private defendant named in 0glala I and was dismissed on the
basis of res judicata. 0glala 11, 722 F.2d at 1411.
226..Vavajo, 809 F.2d at 1465-66. Congress was concerned that some meritorious In-
dian claim might be inadvertently omitted from the Commission's jurisdiction. Therefore,
it recommended that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Commission be as broad as pos-
sible. "The bill would establish . . . a body, responsible to the Court of Claims and the
Supreme Court of the United States with respect to all legal controversies. It would re-
quire all pending Indian claims of whatever nature, contractual and non-contractual, legal
and nonlegal, to be submitted to this fact- finding body within five years, and would outlaw
claims not so submitted." /d. at 1465.
227. Id. at 1464.
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court found this argument unpersuasive, and concluded that the Tribe's
claim was cognizable under the ICCA, since the taking was one which
arose under executive orders of the President. Claims which arise under
executive orders are specifically covered under section 2 of the ICCA
and, therefore, are within the jurisdiction of the Commission. 22 8 More-
over, as illustrated in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States,2 29 the ICCA
"clearly granted jurisdiction to litigate just what the Navajo Tribe would
like to litigate in this case - validity of Indian title to land."' 230 As in
Yankton, if the Tribe here had timely brought its actions under the ICCA,
its sole remedy would have been an award of money damages.
23 1
Finally, the Tribe attempted to categorize its claim as an action to
quiet title.2 3 2 Such action, however, invokes the Quiet Title Act of
1972, which contains a twelve year statute of limitations that was ex-
ceeded by the Tribe in the instant case.
23 3
b. Indispensability of the United States
The Tribe argued that the district court erred in holding that the
claim against the remaining defendants must be dismissed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b). Relying on Rule 19(b), the dis-
trict court opined that since the action against the United States had
failed and given that the United States was deemed an indispensable
party to the litigation, the action against the private defendants should
also be dismissed. Implementation of Rule 19(b) is largely left to the
discretion of the trial court. Therefore, the reviewing court will disturb
the trial court's holding only if it finds that the trial court abused its
228. Id. at 1471. Under section 2 of the ICCA the Commission was empowered to hear
cases falling under the following five broad categories:
(1) claims in law or equity arising under the constitution, laws, treaties of the
United States, and Executive Orders of the President; (2) all other claims in law
or equity, including those sounding in tort, with respect to which the claimant
would have been entitled to sue in a court of the United States if the United
States was subject to suit; (3) claims which would result if the treaties, contracts,
and agreements between the claimant and the United States were revised on the
ground of fraud, duress, unconscionable consideration, mutual or unilateral mis-
take, whether of law or fact, or any other ground cognizable by a court of equity;
(4) claims arising from the taking by the United States, whether as the result of a
treaty of cession or otherwise, of lands owned or occupied by the claimant with-
out the payment for such lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant; and
(5) claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any
existing rule of law or equity.
25 U.S.C. § 70(a) (1976).
229. 272 U.S. 351 (1926).
230. .Vavajo, 809 F.2d at 1466. In Yankton, the Tribe claimed title to a piece of land
known as the Red Pipe-Stone Quarry. It sought judicial reformation of its title, not com-
pensation for the taking of the land by the United States. The Tribe prevailed in that the
Supreme Court recognized that it owned the property in fee. However, because the land
was subsequently conveyed to bona fide third party purchasers by the United States, the
Court ordered monetary compensation. Yankton v. United States, 272 U.S. 351 (1926).
231..Vavajo, 809 F.2d at 1467.
232. Id. at 1469. The Tribe argued in the alternative, that since its claim was not for
monetary damages it had the right to classify its action as a Quiet Title Action, which falls
outside the bounds of the ICCA, and thus vests the district court with subject matter
jurisdiction.
233. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1469.
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discretion. 2 34 Here, the Tenth Circuit court found no such abuse and
affirmed the lower court's dismissal. 2 35 The Tenth Circuit adopted the
trial court's reasoning that the Tribe's claim against the remaining de-
fendants was, in reality, a challenge to the validity of the transaction by
which the United States assumed title to the subject land. "It is a funda-
mental principle of the law that an instrument may not be cancelled by a
court unless the parties to the instrument are before the court."
' 2 36
The Tenth Circuit was satisfied with the lower court's inquiry as to
whether in "equity and good conscience" it could find the United States
indispensable. The Tenth Circuit found that to avoid potential preju-
dice both to the interest of the United States and those of the other
defendants, dismissal of the remaining defendants was required.
2 37
The court conceded, however, that by affirming the dismissal, the
tribe had no alternative adequate remedy at law. The court reasoned,
however, that the weight afforded this particular factor should be mini-
mal because it arose from the tribe sleeping on its rights and not from
the actions of a third party.
2 38
4. Conclusion
The court was compelled to uphold the legislative intent behind the
ICCA, in which the Act was established to be the exclusive remedy for
Indian claims arising before 1946.239 As the ICCA's sponsor stated:
[L]et us see that the Indians have their fair day in court so that
they can call the various governmental agencies to account on
the obligations that the federal Government assumed. And let
us make sure that when the Indians have their day in court, they
have an opportunity to present all their claims of every kind of
shape, and variety, so that this problem can truly be solved
once and for all without coming back to haunt us or our
successors.
24 0
Here, the Navajo tribe had a claim that was cognizable only under
the ICCA; however, by sleeping on its rights and not bringing its action
timely, it missed its only window of opportunity provided under the law.
234. Id. at 1471; See also Glenny v. American Metal, 494 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1974).
235. Id. at 1476.
236. Id. at 1472 (quoting Terra v. Morton, 360 F. Supp. 452 (D.N.M. 1973), aff'd, 498
F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1974)).
237. Id. at 1472. The trial court found:
(1) the claims against the non-federal parties rested on documents of title or
possession derived from the United States; (2) that the tribe seeks to cancel all
such instruments; (3) that this court has affirmed the principle that all parties to
an instrument must be present, else it may not be cancelled; (4) that, more specif-
ically, validity of a deed or patent issued by the Federal Government cannot be
questioned in suit by a third party against the grantee; and (5) that the Eighth
Circuit Court has found indispensability in analogous circumstances.
Id.
238. Id. at 1473.
239. Id. at 1465.
240. 92 CONG. REC. H5312 (1946) (statement of Rep. Jackson, Chairman, House Com-
mittee on Indian Affairs).
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IV. FERC INTERPRETATION
A. Martin Exploration Management Co. v. FERC
24 '
1. Overview
This case presents a challenge by natural gas producers to the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) natural gas pricing regu-
lations. Specifically challenged are those provisions which provide that
natural gas which qualifies for both a ceiling price or regulated price,
and a deregulated price, as established by the complex statutory scheme
in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)24 2 must be deemed to be
deregulated for purposes of price determination.
2 43
2. Facts
In the NGPA, Congress developed an intricate pricing system by
which natural gas was divided into numerous pricing categories and as-
signed a maximum lawful price. 244 In response to the pricing system
embodied in section 121 of the NGPA, FERC issued a notice of pro-
posed rule making to institute partial decontrol for intrastate gas, gener-
ally, and gas produced from "new wells,"'2 4 5 defined as operations
which commenced on or after February 19, 1977, specifically. 246 This
241. 813 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1987).
242. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1978). Specifically, the producers challenged FERC Or-
der 406 codified at 18 C.F.R. § 270.208 (1986) which provides in pertinent part that:
First sales of natural gas that is deregulated natural gas . . . is price deregulated
and not subject to the maximum lawful prices of the NGPA, regardless of whether
the gas also meets the criteria for some other category of gas subject to a maxi-
mum lawful price under Subtitle A of Title I of the NGPA.
Id.
243. 813 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1987).
244. Martin, 813 F.2d at 1062. The NGPA is a comprehensive esoteric scheme outlin-
ing Congress' intent to settle the market and price imbalance that have historically plagued
the intrastate and interstate gas markets. In 1938 Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act
(NGA), Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 717-
717W (1976)). "The NGA was enacted in response to reports suggesting that the monop-
oly power of interstate pipelines was harming consumer welfare." Aarlin, 813 F.2d at
1062 (quoting Public Service v. Mid-Louisiana, 463 U.S. at 327 (1983)). "The NGA au-
thorized the Federal Power Commission (FPC was superceded by FERC in response to the
Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7101, et seq., 7134) to estab-
lish such price ceilings for the sale of interstate gas for resale as were 'just and reason-
able.' " .Martin, 813 F.2d at 1062; (citing in part 15 U.S.C. § 717(c)(a) (1976)). The NGA
did not regulate the price of gas sold in intrastate markets. This resulted in intrastate gas
commanding higher prices than the regulated interstate gas, which created an artificially
high demand for interstate gas and a coincident shortage in the interstate market.
In response to this market imbalance, Congress and the President endeavored to es-
tablish legislation providing for predictable and steady supplies of natural gas in both the
intrastate and interstate gas markets. Their efforts resulted in the NGPA of 1978 which
"did not adopt either the uniform regulation or the complete deregulation approach in
their entirety; rather, the bill was the 'careful reconciliation of two strong, but divergent,
responses to the natural gas shortage.' " Id. at 1063; (quoting Public Service v. Mid-Louisi-
ana, 463 U.S. at 331 (1983)).
245. Martin, 813 F.2d at 1063. The NGPA defines a new well as one whose surface
drilling began on or after February 19, 1977, or which was deepened by at least 1,000 feet
after that date. See 15 U.S.C. § 3301(3) (1978).
246. Section 121 of the NGPA defines a portion of the complicated pricing system. In
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proposed rule making was entitled Order Number 406.247 Order 406
essentially assigned a deregulated price to gas that qualifies for both a
regulated incentive price and deregulated price.
The price categories established under the NGPA are not mutually
exclusive, "a particular sale may be 'dually qualified' within a 'new' or
'old' gas category and also a 'difficult to produce category.' ",248 This
provides the producer with two pricing categories from which to choose.
Each category is defined and a procedure for price determination is set
out in the statute.24 9 FERC's proposed rule would eliminate the produ-
cers pricing election.
The purpose of the regulated incentive price scheme was to in-
crease the availability of difficult to produce gas and encourage produc-
tion from otherwise marginal wells. 25 ° FERC construed this policy to
mean that natural gas producers should be denied access to a still-regu-
lated category if such access would result in a higher price over a der-
egulated gas price. 25 1 Several parties contested FERC's proposed
order, but FERC upheld the essence of Order No. 406 when it promul-
gated Order Number 406(A). 25 2 Order 406(A) again stated that when-
ever gas qualifies for a deregulated and regulated price, the deregulated
price category would prevail.
2 53
Unhappy with FERC's rehearing results, the gas producers sought
judicial review to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to the
judicial review provision found in the NGPA.2 54 The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed in part and reversed in part, holding that if natural gas qualifies
under more than one pricing category or for an exemption from such a
pricing category, then the statute requires application of the category
that would result in the highest price. This means that if gas qualifies for
both a regulated and deregulated category, the category which yields the
highest price shall prevail. The court also ruled that the application of a
special rule that limits the price obtainable pursuant to an indefinite
price escalator clause to any indefinite price escalator clause in existing
or successor intrastate contracts that was or would have been in excess
of one dollar per million BTU's on December 31, 1984, was a reason-
essence the NGPA "divides natural gas production into numerous categories that are dis-
tinguished by the date that production began from a well or the particular type of drilling
involved." .artin, 813 F.2d at 1063. The three gas categories are "old" gas, "new" gas,
and "difficult to produce" gas.
247. See supra note 242.
248. Martin, 813 F.2d at 1064.
249. Id. at 1064-65; see also NGPA § 503, 15 U.S.C. § 3413 (1978).
250. Martin, 813 F.2d at 1065.
251. Id. at 1066. This case centers around the interpretation of § 121(b)(5) which
states: "If any natural gas qualifies under more than one provision of this subchapter pro-
viding for any maximum lawful price or for any exemption from such a price with respect
to anv first sale of such natural gas, the provision which could result in the highest price
shall be applicable." See 15 U.S.C. § 331 l(b)(5) (1978).
252. Marlin, 813 F.2d at 1065; (Order 406-A, RM 84-14-000. 111 FERC Stats. Regs.
(CCH) 30,614 (November 16, 1984)).
253. Martin, 813 at 1072. The court also reviewed FERC Order 406(B), which ad-
dressed the application of price increases under indefinite price escalator clauses.
254. Id. at 1065.
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able interpretation of the statutes that deregulated intrastate, natural
gas.255
3. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The court addressed (1) whether Section 101(b)(5) of the NGPA
gives natural gas producers the inherent right to elect any applicable
NGPA pricing category, regulated or deregulated, that would result in
the highest price for its product; and (2) whether the commission's regu-
lation regarding the impact of Indefinite Price Escalator Clauses found
in gas purchase contracts on otherwise decontrolled sales of gas was rea-
sonable in light of the congressional intent underlying the NGPA.
2 56
a. Standard Of Review For FERC Actions
The threshold inquiry concerning the standard of review applicable
to FERC interpretations of the NGPA by the court is whether Congress
has addressed the precise issue. If Congressional intent is unambigu-
ous, the court, as well as the agency, must give it effect. 2 57 It is the
traditional stance of the court to defer to the agency's position when it
has chosen between alternative possible constructions of an ambiguous
statute, especially in a highly complex statutory design as is found in the
NGPA. 2 58 The court stated that "[w]here the plain words of the statute
do not answer a particular question, the agency interpretation must be
reasonable, but it need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the
interpretation that the reviewing court would adopt."'2 59 The court
found FERC's regulations to be in direct contravention to the clear in-
tent of Congress, and therefore held FERC's regulation void, as it was
applied to incentive price determination.
2 60
b. Interpretation of NGPA Pricing System
Gas producers argued that Congress, by enacting section 101 (b)(5)
of the NGPA, expressly conferred upon producers the right to select the
highest price its gas could achieve under the applicable pricing catego-
ries. They also argued that the commission's regulation automatically
eliminated this statutory right of election. 2 6 1 The court, finding the pro-
ducer's argument dispositive, concluded that Congress "anticipated pre-
cisely" the dual category pricing question in section 101 (b)(5), and that
FERC could not deny gas producers a right which Congress specifically
255. Id. at 1059. 1065.
256. Id. at 1065.
257. Id. (quoting Chevron v. Natural Resources, 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984)).
258. Id. See also Union Texas v. FERC, 721 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1983).
259. Id. See, e.g., Chemical v. Natural Resources, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1066. FERC interprets the "cease to apply" language of § 121 of NGPA,
that applies to the deregulation of certain categories of gas, to mean that "if gas has been
determined to be in one o[lthe listed categories, there is no longer a ceiling price for such




c. Incentive Pricing Under Section 1Ol(b)(5)
In deciding an issue of first impression, the Tenth Circuit held that
section 101(b) (5) applied to those categories of gas "providing for any
maximum lawful price or for any exemption from such a price."126 3 FERC
argued that reference to "any exemption from such a price" does not
refer to deregulated gas, but allows FERC to establish special ceiling
prices in particular situations.26 4 The court responded that FERC's
ability to establish special ceiling prices in certain situations is covered
by section 101(b)(5); however, the court also declared that section
101(b)(5) applied to deregulated gas.
26 5
The producers argued that Congress established higher ceiling
prices for certain categories of natural gas, i.e., those gases that are con-
sidered difficult to produce, for the express purpose "[of assuring] ade-
quate supplies of natural gas at fair prices."' 2 66 Two of these categories,
stripper wells and tight formation producing gas, fall within dual pricing
categories: incentive pricing under sections 108 and 107(c)(5), respec-
tively; and, deregulated prices under sections 102 and 103.267 When
faced with such a pricing dilemma, the producers argued that section
101(b)(5) allows them to elect the provision which could result in the
highest price, assuming the underlying contract permits such an elec-
tion. Any other interpretation, producer's argued, eliminating the pric-
ing election would circumscribe the intent of Congress. 268 Embracing
the producers analysis, the court concluded that FERC's orders rested
on the erroneous assumption that gas can be determined to qualify for a
particular category without going through the specific determination
procedure set forth in the statute. The court therefore concluded that
FERC's interpretation could not be upheld.
2 69
The court noted that the NGPA was a hard fought compromise
262. Id. at 1066.
263. Id. at 1067 (emphasis supplied).
264. Id.
265. Id. In support of its position the court points out that its interpretation of the
word "exemption" is also consistent with the meaning of "exemption" as found through-
out the NGPA, speciicallv § 101(b)(9), which provides: "In the case of ... any price which
is established under any contract for the first sale of natural gas which is exempted under
Part B of this subchapter from the application of a maximum lawful price under this sub-
chapter, such maximum lawftl price, or such exemption from such a maximum lawful
price shall not supercede or nullify the effectiveness of the price established under such
contract." Id. (emphasis added). See also 15 U.S.C. § 331 I(b)(9) (1978); Pennzoil v. FERC,
645 F.2d 360, 374 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982).
266. ,la tint, 813 F.2d at 1070 (quoting Transcontinental v. State, 106 S. Ct. 719
(1986)).
267. Id. at 1064.
268. When addressing Section 121(b)(5) the court quoted SenatorJackson who noted
that it "stands for (the proposition that a producer may claim or apply for the highest price
to which he is entitled. It does not imply an administrative duty to compel a State or
Federal agency to search through the various price classifications tinder the Act and find
the permissible price." Id. at 1070 (quoting 124 (oN,. REc. 29.109 (1978)).
269. Marin, 813 F.2d at 1070.
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"and a careful reconciliation of two strong, but divergent responses to
the natural gas shortage." 2 70 The overall purpose of the Act was "to
provide incentive prices to encourage exploration and development of
new reserves in the short-term, and to gradually substitute market forces
for regulated prices by phasing in deregulation in 1985 and 1987."271
The court emphasized that the NGPA is not exclusively a deregulation
statute, but rather a combination of phased deregulation and incentive
pricing, that serves to maximize gas production from all phases of the
gas exploration effort. The general wisdom was that natural gas prices
would rise steadily in the future.
272
Prices have actually dropped drastically, however, and this ac-
counts for the anomalous situation we now see: producers seek
the regulated ceiling price rather than the deregulated market
price. As enunciated in section 101(b)(5), the category which
could result in the highest price is available to producers.
Hence, "gas that has been qualified in both a regulated and
deregulated category will now be sold at the regulated price
until the market price rises above the ceiling price." Therefore,
provided the market price remains below the ceiling price sec-
tion 101 (b)(5) will have the unanticipated effect of operating as
a price floor for producers.
2 73
The court also remarked that Congress surely possessed the author-
ity to amend this perhaps unintended application of the NGPA, how-
ever, since Congress has to date refrained from doing so, the courts'
only role is "simply to give effect to the words Congress has chosen."
'2 74
Accordingly, the court held that "FERC acted contrary to the intent of
Congress as evidenced in the unambiguous language of section
101 (b) (5).
2 7 5
d. Application of Indefinite Price Escalator Clauses
The court also reviewed a segment of FERC Order 406-B, concern-
ing the deregulation of intrastate gas.2 76 The relevant statutory provi-
sion, 15 U.S.C. § 3331(a)(3), 27 7 "deregulates intrastate gas that is sold
under a contract that had set a price in excess of $ 1.00 on December 31,
270. Id. at 1070 (quoting Public Service v. Mid-Louisiana, 463 U.S. at 331).
271. Id. at 1070 (quoting FERC Reg. 49 Fed. Reg. at 36,401; § 49 Fed. Reg. at 46,878).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1071.
274. Id. at 1072.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1072; Rule 406-B, issued February 15, 1985, RM 84-14000-30, FERC (CCH)
61,152, adopts rules under NGPA § 121(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 3331(a)(3); § 121(e). 15 U.S.C.
§ 3321(e) and 15 U.S.C. § 3315 (b)(3)(A).
277. Section 121(a)(3) provides for the deregulation of "natural gas sold under an ex-
isting contract, any successor to an existing contract, or any rollover contact if (A) such
natural gas was not committed or dedicated to interstate commerce on November 8, 1978;
and (B) the price paid for the last deliveries of such natural gas occurring on December 31,
1984, or, if no deliveries occurred on such date, the price that would have been paid had





Of the gas producers involved in this litigation, only Shell Oil Cor-
poration contested FERC Order 406-B. This Order, which essentially
allowed for any gas found to be sold at a price established under an
indefinite price escalator clause, returns that gas to a controlled status
thus subjecting its price to the limitations set forth in Sections 121(e)
and 105(b)(3)(A) of the NGPA. 279 Congress enacted these statutes in
response to the fear that "following deregulation, the operation of in-
definite price escalator clauses . . . could operate to increase rapidly in-
trastate gas prices following deregulation.
'280
Shell concurred with the commission that the pricing rule in section
105(b)(3)(A) operates to limit only those price increases created by an
indefinite price escalator clause. Shell's position departs from that of
the Commission on the issue of what gas category is subject to the pric-
ing rule. Shell urged a narrow interpretation of the statute that would
provide that "the limitation applies to intrastate contracts only 'if they
were above $1.00 on December 31, 1984 solely by reason of indefinite price
escalator clauses.' "281 This argument advanced by Shell was found by the
Commission to be inconsistent with the governing statutory provisions
and the legislative history.2 82 FERC concluded "that the limitations im-
posed by sections 121(e) and 105(b)(3)(A), apply to any indefinite price
escalator clause in an existing or successor intrastate contract that is, or
would have been, in excess of $1.00 per MMBTU's on December 31,
1984."283
The crucial difference between the two positions is that the "FERC
interpretation does not focus on how the price was established on De-
cember 31, 1984, while Shell would limit the application of the special
rule to those circumstances in which the indefinite price escalator clause
established the price on December 31, 1984. ' '284 The court concluded
that FERC's interpretation of the statute was reasonable and that the
language of the statute did not require the interpretation promoted by
Shell.285
5. Conclusion
While oil and gas producers struggle with the unprecedented low
gas prices plaguing the contemporary market, this case reaffirms the
278. Marlin, 813 F.2d at 1072.
279. Id. at 1073. Sections 121(e) and 105(b)(3)(A) serve to limit the price that can be
established by an indefinite price escalator clause.
280. Id. at 1072-73; quoting 124 CONG. REC. 38,365 (1978) (Statement of Rep.
Dingell).
281. Id. at 1073 (quoting Supplemental Initial Brief of Shell Offshore Inc. and Shell
Western E & P, Inc. in Brief for Appellant at 12, Martin Exploration Management Co. v.
FERC, 813 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis supplied)).
282. Id. For example, the conference report makes it clear that how the December 31,
1984, price exceeds $1.00 is irrelevant.
283. Vartin, 813 F.2d at 1073 (quoting FERC 49 Fed. Reg. at 50, 641).
284. Id. at 1073.
285. Id. at 1074.
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producers' right to elect whichever gas category could result in the high-
est price for its product. Such ruling serves (1) to encourage drilling
and production of natural gas, particularly tight gas sands which are
found in ample supply in certain areas of the Rocky Mountain Region of
the United States; and (2) promotes the Congressional intent to estab-
lish a viable gas market characterized by predictable supplies and prices
of natural gas.
CONCLUSION
In general, the natural resource extraction industry did not fare well
in a number of cases decided during this survey period. In Park County,
the court found that the paper transaction of issuing an onshore federal
oil and gas lease does not automatically trigger the EIS requirement
found in NEPA. Once a lease has been issued, however, virtually un-
restricted court access is available to claims pursued in the name of
NEPA. In Coastal States and FMC, the court decided that a coal lease
subject to readjustment will be adjusted according to the law in effect at
the time of readjustment, regardless of how drastic it changes the terms
and conditions of the original coal lease contract. In Navajo Tribe of Indi-
ans, the court held firm to the congressional intent behind the Indian
Claims Commission Act, by holding that any Indian claim arising before
1946 and not timely filed with the Commission is forever barred. Fi-
nally, in Martin Exploration Management Co., the court concluded that in-
centive natural gas pricing means that producers may elect the highest
price for its natural gas if such gas falls into both a regulated and der-
egulated category.
It seems evident that based on the cases analyzed during this survey
period, the Tenth Circuit Court will not be accused of showing favorit-
ism to the extractive industries that do business within its jurisdictional
borders. It appears that the narrow statutory construction practiced by
the court in the cases discussed herein, requires future industry litigants
to approach the Tenth Circuit forum with much care and caution.
David N. Karpel
ol. 5:4
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ADDENDUM
After the preceeding article was accepted for publication, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's Martin Explo-
ration Management Co. v. FERC I decision in FERC v. Martin Exploration
Management Co.2 The entire Court joined in Justice Brennan's opinion
except Justice White who took no part in the decision. The Court up-
held FERC's interpretation3 of The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1969
(NGPA).4
The NGPA established various categories of natural gas for the pur-
poses of phased price deregulation and also set up a three stage elimina-
tion of price ceilings. 5 Recognizing that many of the catagories
overlapped, Congress provided in § 101(b)(5) of the NGPA "[i]f any
natural gas qualifies under more than one provision of this title provid-
ing for any maximum lawful price or for any exemption from such a
price with respect to any first sale of such natural gas, the provision
which could result in the highest price shall be applicable."
'6
Many gas producers had entered long term contracts containing a
two tiered pricing structure. If the gas was regulated the contract price
was usually near the ceiling allowed by law; if the gas was deregulated
the contract price was based on market price.7 Because market prices
had plunged below the regulated price ceilings, the producers stood to
reap higher prices if their gas was classified as regulated rather than
deregulated. 8
The Court held the language of the NGPA "[i]f any natural gas
qualifies under more than one provision of this title . . . the provision
which could result in the highest price shall be applicable" meant that
where gas could be classified as regulated or deregulated it would be
classified as deregulated. 9 The Court reasoned that a deregulated clas-
sification could result in a higher price than a regulated price.' 0 The jus-
tices rejected the Tenth Circuit's reasoning that "could" in § 101(b)(5)
meant that the gas must be classified according to the highest price that
could be obtained at any particular point in time."I Reasoning that "the
conditional meaning of 'could' makes perfect sense if the statute does
not refer to particular contracts but rather to the generic situation of
parties in a precontract state: the provision that allows the parties to
contract to the highest conceivable price applies."'
12
After examining the legislative history of the NGPA, the Court
I. 813 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1987).
2. 108 S.Ct. 1765 (1988).
3. FERC Order 406 codified at 18 C.F.R. § 270.208 (1986).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 3311 (b)(5) (1978).






!1. Id. at 1769.
12. Id.
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found the Tenth Circuit's decision contrary to the whole thrust of the
Act because it would have the effect of changing a statutory scheme of
price ceilings and deregulation to one of unintended price supports for
producers.' 3 No one involved in the legislative process suggested pro-
ducers should receive more than deregulation would allow. Deregula-
tion was seen as "the maximum economic incentive" for producers.14
Finally, the Court rejected the Tenth Ciruit's decision because it
would make the applicable provision of the NGPA vary from producer to
producer, contract to contract and day to day depending on the market
price of gas for any particular type of gas. 15 The Court found "[t]he
statute is phrased in a general way that implies that all gas fitting the
same overlapping provisions will be treated the same, and one would
normally expect that a regulatory regime would apply uniformly rather
than varying in such a chaotic fashion."' 16 The Justices found no Con-
gressional intent that the classification of gas should turn on contractual
terms. 17
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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